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I 
Two Concepts of Cause 
What is it for smoking to be a positive causal factor in the 
production of heart attacks among U.S. adults? The probabilistic 
theory of causality answers that smoking must raise each 
individual's chance of a coronary or, more modestly, that 
smoking must raise at least one individual's chance, but not 
lower anyone else's.1 This theory provides an account of the 
concept of property causation. 
Smoking may increase different individuals' chances of 
coronaries by different amounts, since individuals may differ in 
relevant physical ways. Some individuals exercise while others 
do not; some have high cholesterol diets while others do not; and 
so on. Let each B, be a maximal conjunction of all such relevant 
background factors so that the set of all them's encompasses all 
possible combinations of factors (including the presence or 
absence of each). The probabilistic theory of causality asserts 
that smoking (C) is a positive causal factor in producing heart 
attacks (E) in the population if and only if 
P r (£ /C & Bi) > P r (£ /no t -C & 5,), for each Bx. 
This theory, defended in various forms by Good [1961-2], 
Suppes [1970], Cartwright [1978], Skyrms [1980], Eells and 
Sober [1983], and Sober [1984b, 1985], has been criticized by 
Hesslow [1976], Salmon [1980], and Otte [1981]. Some of these 
criticisms can be reinterpreted as identifying contingent assump-
tions that the theory must impose. First, the probabilities linking 
causal factors to their effects must be intermediate, since 
deterministic relationships render relevant probabilities unde-
fined. Second, correlated effects must possess a common cause 
11 will ignore this latter, more plausible and weaker, formulation, due to Skyrms 
[1980], since my arguments apply equally to both. 
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98 I—ELLIOTT SOBER 
that screens off each from the other; without this principle of the 
common cause, on which see Reichenbach [1956], Van 
Fraassen [1980], and Salmon [1984], the probabilistic theory of 
causality can erroneously judge an event merely correlated with 
an effect to be a cause of it. These two restrictions, plus some care 
in specifying what a 'relevant background context' is, on which 
see Eells and Sober [1983] and Eells [1985], suffice to insure the 
correctness of the probabilistic theory. 
What is it for Harry's smoking to cause him to have a heart 
attack? It is neither necessary nor sufficient that smoking should 
be a positive causal factor for coronaries in the population 
containing Harry—among U.S. adults, say. It is not necessary, 
since if smoking increased some individuals' chances and 
reduced those of others, this would mean that smoking is not a 
positive causal factor in the population as a whole; there would 
be no such thing as the causal role it plays with respect to heart 
attacks in the entire population. But this need not prevent 
smoking from producing an infarction in poor Harry. 
It is not sufficient, since smoking could be a positive causal 
factor, even if no one smoked, and even if no one had a heart 
attack. Smoking counts as a positive causal factor in virtue of a 
relationship between various conditional probabilities; these 
probabilities can be well defined even if the conditioned and 
conditioning properties are not in fact exemplified.2 The 
singular fact about Harry involves the relation of token causality; 
Harry's smoking can't cause him to have a heart attack unless he 
actually smokes and actually has a heart attack. Token 
causality, unlike property causality, requires that the relata 
actually obtain. 
The two concepts of cause differ in further ways. Even if 
Harry smoked and then had a heart attack, the fact about 
property causality does not suffice to ensure that his smoking 
actually caused his heart attack. The smoking may have placed 
him at greater risk, but some quite different cause may have 
produced the coronary. Furthermore, it is provable that 
property causality is not in general transitive (Suppes 1970, 
Eells and Sober 1983), but no plausible case has been made for 
2
 This is a consequence of avoiding an actual relative frequency interpretation of 
probability, which there is ample reason in this context to do anyway. 
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thinking that token causality is not transitive (Sober 1984b, 
1985). 
In addition, examples that have identical probabilistic 
structure can differ over corresponding facts about token 
causation. Here I refer to the comparison of the kicked golf ball 
and the sprayed plant, discussed in Eells and Sober [1983] and 
Sober [1985]. A golf ball rolling towards the cup is kicked by a 
squirrel, which thereby lowers the ball's probability of going 
into the cup. Improbably enough, though, the ball ricochets 
here and there and then drops in. Here is a case in which the kick 
token-caused the ball to drop in, even though a kick of just that 
kind is not a positive causal factor for producing balls in cups. 
Contrast this example with Cartwright's [1979] case of a 
healthy plant that is sprayed by a defoliant, which thereby 
lowers the plant's probability of surviving. Improbably enough, 
though, the plant survives. The spraying is not a positive causal 
factor for producing survival. However, in striking contrast to 
the squirrel's kick, we do not say, in this case, that the spraying 
token-caused the surviving. This pair of examples suggests, not 
only that token causes need not raise the probability of their 
effects, but also that token causation is not definable from 
probabilities alone.3 
It is sometimes suggested that token causality involves energy 
transfer. This may be so, but the problem of the sprayed plant 
versus the kicked golf ball is not resolved by this observation. 
The squirrel transferred energy to the golf ball, but so too did the 
defoliant to the plant. A theory of token causality that appeals to 
energy transfer will have to give more details, if it is to resolve 
this puzzle. 
To all these differences between property causation and token 
causation, I add another: Property causation is pretty well 
understood, at least if the assumptions made by the probabilistic 
theory are not too restrictive. But token causality is fascinating 
in its opacity. We know what it is not, but very little about what 
it is. 
This last contrast would not matter, if token causality did not 
matter. But it does. In causally explaining a token event, we try 
31 say 'suggests' since it doesn't necessarily follow that a more fine-grained look at 
these examples won't uncover probabilistic differences of a relevant sort. I myself am 
skeptical that this can be done, though. 
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to trace it back to the causes that produced it. Causal 
explanation is preeminently the search for token causes. Yet, we 
frequently try to fulfill requests for causal explanation by 
amassing facts about property causality. If our question is why 
Harry had a heart attack, we assemble information about his 
characteristics and identify which were positive causal factors 
(and which negative) for having a coronary. But this standard 
strategy raises a question: How can facts about property 
causality be relevant in our search for causal explanation, if 
token causality and property causality are two concepts, not 
one? 
Hempel [1965] declined to require that an explanation cite a 
causal generalization, though he did demand that a law connect 
the initial conditions with the explanandum event. Some critics 
(e.g., Salmon [1971, 1984]) have required causal generalizations, 
while others (e.g., Scriven [1959]) have insisted that the law isn't 
part of the explanation proper, but merely serves to justify the 
claim that the initial conditions explain the explanandum. These 
two reactions to Hempel derived from very different consider-
ations, but the distinction drawn here between property 
causality and token causality leads them to converge. For 
Harry's smoking to causally explain Harry's heart attack, it isn't 
enough that smoking causes heart attacks—what is essential is 
that Harry's smoking caused his heart attack.4 Setting to one side 
the question of whether all explanation is causal explanation,5 
we may yet recognize that a causal explanation must cite a token 
causal relationship, not a property causal generalization. The 
role of the causal generalization is epistemological, as we shall 
now see. 
II 
The Connecting Principle 
The principle I want to discuss describes an epistemological 
connection between the two concepts of cause. The rough idea is 
that if a token event of type Cis followed by a token event of type 
41 therefore am in agreement with Anscombe's [1971] contention that (token) 
causality does not consist in the existence of a lawful regularity. See Sober [1985] for 
further discussion. 
51 argue that equilibrium explanations are a counterexample to the claim that all 
explanation is causal explanation in Sober [1983a] and [1984b], 
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E,6 then the support of the hypothesis that the first event token-
caused the second increases as the strength of the property causal 
relation of C to E does. So, in our coronary example, if Harry's 
smoking is followed by his having a coronary, then the 
hypothesis that the first token-caused the second is better 
supported to the degree that smoking is a strong property-cause 
of coronaries. 
I will call this the Connecting Principle. The question 
immediately arises of how the idea of 'support' is to be 
represented. One could view this as a primitive concept or try to 
clarify it in terms of the notion of subjective probability. In the 
next section, I will follow a third approach: the likelihood of a 
hypothesis, relative to an observation, indicates how well the 
observation supports the hypothesis (Hacking [1965], Edwards 
[1972]). I must emphasize that the likelihood of a hypothesis is 
not the probability it receives from an observation, but is the 
probability it confers on the observation. 
For the present, however, I will talk about a primitive support 
metric, expressed by 'S(H/E)', which measures the support of//, 
given E. It can assume values between -1 a n d + 1 . 1 will use V to 
denote a token event that occurs at place-time i, and ' C and '£" 
to represent properties. 'C(fc)' also denotes an event—the event 
of place-time h's having the property C. The Connecting 
Principle can be stated as follows: 
If C is a causal factor for producing E in population P of 
magnitude m, then S{C(tx) token caused E(t2)/C{t{) and 
E(t2) occurred in population P\ — m. 
This principle, if correct, shows how facts of property causality 
bear on claims of token causality. 
How might one measure the strength of a causal factor in a 
population? We know that smoking may be more risky for some 
individuals than for others, depending on which suite of 
background factors they exemplify. Suppose a few individuals 
have their chances greatly augmented, most face only an 
intermediate increase in probability, while a few others have 
their chances increased little or not at all. How are these various 
6
 More precisely, they are causally connectaife in the sense allowed by relativity 
theory. 
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102 I—ELLIOTT SOBER 
facts to be assembled into a single number representing the 
magnitude of the impact of smoking on heart attacks in the 
population as a whole? 
A natural strategy is averaging, where the impact within a 
background context is weighted by that background context's 
probability of occurrence in the population. In the above ex-
ample, the magnitude in the population should be intermediate, 
because the vulnerabilities weighted by their frequencies are 
symmetrically distributed around this mean. The proposal is this: 
If C is a causal factor for producing E in population P, then 
the magnitude of the causal factor is 
£ {(Pr(£/C & Bi) - P r (£ /no t -C & &)} X Pr'(fi). 
I adopt the average difference the causal factor makes in the 
probability of the effect, rather than the average ratio, for 
reasons that Salmon [1980] raised against Good's [1961-2] 
proposal. A factor that on average raises the probability from 
0.25 to 0.75 should count as more powerful than one that on 
average increases the probability from 0.001 to 0.003. Notice 
that this measure will fall between 0 and 1 if the factor is positive 
and between -1 and 0 if the factor is negative. 
An important feature of the probabilistic theory of property 
causality is that it is a three-place relation; the population is one 
of the relata. C may count as a positive causal factor for 
producing E in one population, but not in another; for example, 
C may be a positive causal factor in a subpopulation, but not in a 
more inclusive superpopulation. This raises an important 
question for the Connecting Princicple. If we are interested in 
the relationship between two token events, what population 
ought we to consider? If the question is whether Harry's smoking 
caused his heart attack, should we examine the causal role of 
smoking in his age group, his neighbourhood, among all U.S. 
adults, or what? 
A principle of total evidence is appropriate here. One should 
circumscribe the population by using all the factors one knows 
to be true of Harry. If you know his age, weight, and dietary 
habits, then the relevant question is the degree to which 
smoking affects the probability of heart attacks among individuals 
of that sort. If, on the other hand, you know only that he is a U.S. 
adult, then that will be the relevant population. 
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CAUSAL FACTORS, INFERENCE AND EXPLANATION 103 
A problem nevertheless remains. Suppose, of the traits one 
knows to be causally relevant to having a heart attack, one only 
knows Harry's situation with respect to some of them. For 
example, suppose exercise level is relevant, but we don't know 
Harry's. In assessing the magnitude of the impact of smoking on 
heart attacks, we must see how smoking affects the probability of 
coronaries within background contexts that mention different 
levels of exercise. What weight are we to give these different 
contexts—how are their probabilities to be ascertained (Sklar 
[1971])? An expedient would be to take the actual frequency of a 
background context as the best estimate of its probability. 
Whether this strategy is defensible depends on the connection 
between the population frequencies and Harry's chances of 
having the various traits in question. 
What will this proposal imply about Harry's heart attack? 
Suppose we are interested in deciding whether the coronary was 
due to Harry's smoking or to Harry's high level of cholesterol 
consumption. It is known that Harry has both these traits; the 
question is whether we should trace back the coronary to one of 
them or to the other. Suppose, for simplicity, that these are the 
only two causal factors for coronaries. We need to compare the 
difference between the impact of smoking (S) on heart attacks 
(//), holding fixed the fact that Harry consumes lots of 
cholesterol (C), and the impact of cholesterol, holding fixed the 
fact that Harry is a smoker. That is, we need to discover whether 
this inequality is true: 
Pr(H/S & C) - Pr{H/not-S &C)> 
?r(H/S & C) - Pr(H/S & not-C) 
This simplifies to the constraint that smoking is the more 
powerful causal factor if and only if 
Pr(H/S & not-C) > Pr(H/not-S & Q. 
If this inequality is true, the Connecting Principle will imply 
that it is more plausible to think that Harry's coronary was 
token-caused by his smoking than that it was caused by his 
cholesterol consumption. 
The Connecting Principle singles out as the most plausible 
token cause the causal factor that makes the largest (positive) 
difference in the probability of the effect; indeed, if all the 
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candidates for token causation are positive factors, they each 
will have the same absolute maximum; each raises the 
probability to the same maximum when it acts in conjunction 
with all the rest. The relevant question is what difference 
each characteristic makes—i.e., how much difference in the 
probability of the effect is implied by not having the trait present. 
Of course, there is a third candidate that might be considered. 
Suppose one wishes to consider whether the conjunctive 
property of smoking and cholesterol token-caused Harry's heart 
attack. The conjunction of smoking and cholesterol may be a 
more powerful factor than is either smoking or cholesterol, when 
each is taken alone. The Connecting Principle then implies that 
the best supported hypothesis about token-causality is the 
conjunctive one that Harry's smoking and cholesterol intake 
jointly caused his coronary. 
This is hardly surprising and may even be some sign that the 
Connecting Principle is on the right track. The problem of 
assessing the evidence for hypotheses of token causality is like 
any evidential problem; whether a hypothesis is the one best 
supported by the evidence depends on what the field of 
competing hypotheses is. It is not especially counterintuitive in 
the case in which conjunctive causes are among the alternatives 
that the best supported hypothesis may be that all the causal 
factors played a role. This is perfectly consistent with there being 
investigative contexts in which such conjunctions are not taken 
to be in the set of available alternatives. Examples of this latter 
type will be described in the next section. 
Not only does applying the Connecting Principle depend on 
what the alternative hypotheses are taken to be; in addition, our 
formulation of the set of competitors involves presuppositions 
about the underlying causal processes. It is hardly inevitable 
that Harry's heart attack must trace back to either his smoking 
or his cholesterol level. If these two factors bring about heart 
attacks in quite different ways, then the discrimination problem 
may make sense. But if they work in basically the same way, the 
question may fail to be well formed. It may be like the famous 
nature/nurture confusion of asking whether someone's height is 
due to his genes or his environment, or of asking of a lit match 
whether its ignition was due to the presence of oxygen or to its 
dryness. 
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III 
Phytogenies, Infections, and Rumours 
Systematists attempt to reconstruct genealogical relationships 
among species from data concerning their characteristics. A set 
of taxa might be taken to be the terminal nodes of a branching 
phylogenetic tree; the question is how these taxa are to be 
grouped by postulating common ancestors. In its simplest form 
the question is posed by three taxa: Do any two share a common 
ancestor that neither shares with the third? 
One aspect of this problem involves deciding whether a given 
species with a particular characteristic ought to be assigned an 
ancestor in the tree with that or another characteristic. In its 
simplest form, a character will come in two states, P and not-P. 
If a species has one of these, should it be assigned an ancestor 
that is the same or different? 
Regardless of whether ancestor and descendant had the same 
or different characteristics, it will be true that the ancestor 
produced—was the token cause of—the descendent. And not only 
will it be true that the ancestor in some sense caused the 
descendent to exist; in addition, the descendent's character 
states trace back on a causal chain to the ancestor's even when 
ancestor and descendent exhibit different character states. 
If ancestor and descendent are in the same character state, the 
descendent might have obtained its character state by unmodified 
descent. But there is no guarantee that this is true, since any even 
number of changes can lead ancestor and descendent to 
match. O n the other hand, if ancestor and descendent do not 
match, then an odd number of changes must have occurred in 
the lineage linking them. Hence, assigning a P ancestor to a P 
descendent requires no evolutionary changes, but is consistent 
with the existence of any even number of such; on the other 
hand, assigning a not-P ancestor to a P descendent requires at 
least one evolutionary change, but is consistent with the 
existence of any odd number of such. The principle of cladistic 
parsimony asserts that one should minimize the number of 
required evolutionary transitions (Farris [1982], (Sober [1983b]) 
and so it favors assigning a P ancestor to a P descendent. 
I have argued elsewhere that broad structural features of 
evolutionary processes imply that species character states are 
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positive causal factors for themselves, so to speak; whatever 
evolutionary forces impinge in a lineage, the probability of its 
ending in the P state is greater if it begins in that state than it 
would be if it began in the not-P state (Sober [1983b, 1984a, 
1985]). This, I have argued, is part of the underlying rationale of 
cladistic parsimony. My point here is not to argue that 
evolutionary theory implies this claim about causal factors, but 
to show how its use can justify linking a descendent to one 
ancestor rather than to another. 
The inference proceeds in accordance with the Connecting 
Principle. If one possible ancestor has character states that are 
positive with respect to a species' states, while another possible 
ancestor has character states that are negative with respect to 
the species' states, the evidence supports the claim that the 
species traces back to the first ancestor rather than to the 
second. 
The spread of an infection through a population is a diffusion 
process that is structurally similar to the evolutionary spread of a 
novel characteristic through a population. I now sketch an 
epidemiological example that illustrates the Connecting Principle. 
Introducing an infected individual into a population that has 
never before been exposed to the disease is a positive causal 
factor for the occurrence of that disease in others at a later date. 
Suppose two such infected individuals are introduced simul-
taneously. It is found that a third individual has come down 
with the disease a while later. The question is: to which of the 
two initially infected individuals does the third individual's 
disease trace back? 
Assume that the presence of the two initial individuals is the 
only relevant factor to consider, so that we do not have to bring 
in further background contexts. Suppose further that the first 
individual was much more contagious than the second—i.e., an 
individual's probability of coming down with the disease, given 
contact with the first, exceeds an individual's probability of 
getting sick, given contact with the second. This means that the 
first individual's diseased state is a more powerful causal factor 
than the second's. If so, the Connecting Principle licences the 
conclusion that it is more plausible that the third individual 
contracted the disease from the first than that he did so from the 
second. 
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Rumours spread somewhat the way infections do (Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [ 1981 ]). Reformulate the above example so 
that two individuals simultaneously discover or invent a new 
idea, which is found in others in the population some time later. 
From which of the inventors did the later individuals acquire 
their ideas? If the first is more apt to impart the discovery, given 
contact with him, then his ideas are more contagious than the 
second individual's. It is plausible to think that historians of 
cultural evolution use the Connecting Principle when they 
reconstruct lineages of intellectual influence. 
IV 
Inferring Causal Factors Versus Inferring Causal Connections 
The logic underlying the Connecting Principle implies that 
there is an important difference between the following two 
questions: Given that one or more individuals have traits that 
are causal factors in the production of an effect, which of them 
actually produced the effect? Given that an effect occurs, which 
positive causal factor is most plausibly thought to be present in 
its cause? In the first case, you infer a causal connection, given 
knowledge that various causal factors are present. In the second, 
you infer the presence of a causal factor, given knowledge that 
the effect occurred. All the earlier examples were of the first sort; 
the problem has consistently been one of postulating causal 
connections, not causally relevant events. 
Let's go back to Harry to construct an example that illustrates 
this difference. Harry smoked and had a high cholesterol diet. I 
ask you to say which of these in fact produced his heart attack. 
This is a question of the first kind. 
If smoking is a more powerful causal factor than cholesterol, 
the Connecting Principle instructs us to trace the coronary back 
to the smoking. But suppose almost everyone who smokes also 
exercises strenuously and that exercise is a powerful preventer of 
coronaries. As a result, the incidence of heart attacks among 
smokers is actually quite low—in fact even lower than the 
incidence among nonsmokers. Assume further that high choles-
terol intake is not correlated with any preventer of coronaries. 
The facts about property causality are shown below: 
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Strenuous exercise (E)'—-—^___^ 
Smoking (S) »>Heart Attack (H) 
High Cholesterol Intake (C) + 
Solid arrows indicate causal relevance; the number of plus or 
minus signs represents the magnitude of causal influence. A 
dotted line denotes strong positive correlation. Notice that it will 
be true in this circumstance that the incidence of heart attacks 
among those with high cholesterol intake exceeds the incidence 
of heart attacks among those who smoke. 
If we know that Harry smokes and consumes lots of 
cholesterol, we can infer that he exercises. The Connecting 
Principle is not deterred by the correlation of smoking, but not 
cholesterol intake, with exercise. It quite sensibly reaches the 
conclusion that the smoking produced the coronary. 
However, matters change if we do not know whether Harry 
exercised, and we wish to infer whether he smoked or consumed 
lots of cholesterol, based on the observation that he had a heart 
attack. In this case, the fact that smoking but not cholesterol 
intake is correlated with exercise would be relevant. We then 
would infer via an appeal to likelihood that the better supported 
hypothesis is that Harry consumed cholesterol, since this makes 
the observation (the heart attack) more probable. 
We have here an instance of Simpson's paradox (Cartwright 
[1979], Sober [1984]). The probabilistic inequalities in the 
example are as follows: 
(1) Pr(H/S & C & E) > » Pr(H/not-S & C & E). 
(2) Pr{H/S &C&E)> Pr(H/S & not-C & E). 
(3) Pr(H/S) < Pr(H/not-S). 
(3) Pr(H/Q > Pr(H/not-C). 
The idea that smoking is a much more powerful cause of 
coronaries than is high cholesterol intake (among individuals 
who, like Harry, smoke, consume lots of cholesterol, and 
exercise strenuously) is reflected in the size of the inequalities 
stated in (1) and (2). However, if we wish to infer whether Harry 
was a smoker or a consumer of lots of cholesterol, we would 
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attend to (3) and (4), not to (1) and (2).7 Although smoking is a 
more powerful cause of coronaries than is cholesterol intake, a 
coronary is better evidence for high cholesterol intake than it is 
for smoking. 
V 
Connecting Processes 
Although the Connecting Principle was intially stated in terms 
of a primitive notion of support, its application to phylogenies, 
infections, and rumours involved understanding support in 
terms of likelihood. In each case, one hypothesis of token 
causality was favoured over another because the first conferred a 
higher probability on the observed effect. 
In the phylogenetic example, a descendent (d) with character 
state P is traced back to an ancestor (ai) that also has that 
character state, rather than to an ancestor (a2) that lacks that 
character state. The likelihood rationale rested on the following 
inequality: 
Pr(d is P/ax is P and ax token-caused d) > 
Pr(rf is P/a2 is not-P and a2 token-caused d). 
Some features of the token causal relation involved here bear 
mentioning. 
First, notice that the relationship described obtains between 
the objects (species) d, au and a2. This is somewhat contrary to 
the idea that token-causal relationships canonically obtain 
among events. Would it not be more apposite to formulate this 
relationship as ' ^ ' s having P token-caused ds having P?' 
Indeed, this is precisely what we did when we spoke of Harry's 
smoking as the token cause of his heart attack. 
The reason this formulation must be avoided is that it 
collapses the likelihood differences. Recall that 'X token-caused 
T implies that X and T both occurred. For this reason, 
Pr(«/ is P/ax is P and aj's beingP token-caused ds being P) 
Pr(rf is P/a2 is not-P and a2& being not-P token-caused d's 
being P) = 1. 
7
 In particular, the question of whether Pr(H/S) > Pr(H/C) would be decisive. 
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The token causal connections under study must be conceptually 
distinct from the cause and effect events they link, at least if 
likelihood is to measure evidential support. 
In the phylogenetic case, we already have a vocabulary that 
obeys this requirement. We say that one species gave rise to or 
begat another, and this leaves the characteristics of parent and 
offspring entirely unspecified. In the infection example, we may 
say that one individual came into contact with another (where 
different diseases require different modes of physical contact). In 
the case of rumour and intellectual influence, we speak of one 
person's listening to or being a student of another. 
Likelihood is an epistemological principle. Yet, it enforces a 
requirement on how we formulate token causal hypotheses that 
has ontological significance. Connecting processes exist inde-
pendently of the events they connect. Such processes are like 
channels in which information flows; the existence of the 
channel does not imply what information (if any) actually flows 
over it. 
When one realizes that claims of property causality like 
'smoking causes heart attacks' do not imply that anyone smokes 
or that anyone has a heart attack, it is natural to interpret them 
as meaning that smoking can cause heart attacks; claims of 
property causality describe the potential causal efficacy of 
properties in populations. However, this does not discriminate 
between the two concepts of cause, in that a similar conclusion 
can be drawn about claims of token causality, at least when they 
are formulated in the way just described. To say that one species 
gave rise to another implies that the first can transmit its 
characteristics to the second. Whether it does so is a further 
matter. 
We can describe the potential causal bearing of one property 
on another, leaving open whether tokens of those types are 
actually connected by a process. Or we can describe the actual 
physical connection of two events, leaving it open which 
properties of the first were causally efficacious. Or we can, as it 
were, fuse these two descriptions together so that connecting 
process and connected properties are both implied. This is what 
we do when we say that Harry's smoking token-caused his heart 
attack. 
For phylogenies, infections, and rumours, we isolated an 
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autonomous description of the connecting process, one which 
does not imply the states of the connected events. In Harry's 
case, however, it is not so clear how to do this. What this reveals, 
I would suggest, is ignorance on our part, not a special feature 
that distinguishes heart attacks from phylogenies, infections, 
and rumours. Token causality is a supervenient relationship, 
instantiated by different physical processes in different physical 
contexts. One species' generating another is not much like one 
person's talking to another, except that both are possible 
instantiations of the relationship of token causality. 
Supervenient properties can be pressed into service when the 
underlying physical instantiation is unknown. This is what we 
may do in Harry's case. The state of Harry's circulatory system 
in some way traces back to his smoking (among other things). 
We sometimes use the word 'cause' when we are at a loss for 
further details. 
Russell [1913] said that causality is a concept that a maturing 
science does without. In a not uncharacteristic use/mention 
elision, he also said that the word 'cause' never occurs in 
'advanced sciences'. Unlike Russell, I think that causality is 
doubly central to science; property causality and token 
causality are both fundamental. But causality's supervenience 
explains why Russell may have been partly right about the 
word, if not the thing. The word does tend to vanish, as 
underlying physical processes are identified and given names of 
their own. 
VI 
Conclusion 
Those of us who are skeptical of Hume's idea that there is 
nothing objective in causality beyond certain abstract relation-
ships obtaining between the cause and its effect may nonetheless 
wonder about the epistemology of this recondite entity—the 
causal connection. Do we have independent epistemological 
access to causal connections? Are inferences about them 
separable from inferences about the events such connections are 
said to link? I think the above considerations suggest affirmative 
answers to these questions. The probabilistic theory of causality 
describes probability relations that obtain between causal 
factors and their effects. Such relationships provide evidence 
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for the existence of token causal connections, but neither of these 
concepts of cause can be reduced to the other. In addition, we 
have seen how inference to the existence of causal connections, 
mediated by the Connecting Principle, can be unimpeded by a 
phenomenon (Simpson's paradox) that has important conse-
quences for how one infers the properties of a cause, given 
knowledge of the effect. This conceptual distinctness of causal 
processes from the events they connect is reinforced by the use of 
likelihood to confirm hypotheses of token causality. Although I 
am by no means confident that the Connecting Principle is 
ultimately correct (it may need to be hedged by more 
assumptions), it seems to be a useful point of departure into an 
important aspect of the epistemology of causality.8 
8
 My thanks to Ellery Eells for useful discussion and to the National Science 
Foundation for financial support. 
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CAUSAL FACTORS, CAUSAL INFERENCE, 
CAUSAL EXPLANATION 
Elliott Sober and David Papineau 
//—David Papineau 
I 
Two Types of Causation 
Elliott Sober distinguishes two types of causation, which he calls 
property causation and token causation. Property causation is 
straightforwardly definable in terms of probabilities. But token 
causation is more problematic, not definable in terms of 
probabilities, though probabilities can be epistemologically 
relevant to judgements about token causation. I agree entirely 
that some such distinction is needed in the discussion of 
probabilistic causation. But I am not happy with the way Sober 
makes the distinction. 
I shall not be able to deal with all the important issues Sober 
raises in his interesting paper. I shall concentrate on the 
distinction between two types of causation. In particular, I want 
to argue, against Sober, that both kinds of causation should be 
defined straightforwardly in terms of probabilities. 
As it happens, I myself am suspicious of causes that only make 
their effects probable, and prefer the old-fashioned view that all 
causation is deterministic. But, apart from a few remarks at the 
end, I shall supress these suspicions here, and simply aim to show 
those of you who do believe in non-determining causes that 
Sober's path is unnecessarily circuitous. 
At its simplest, my thesis is that token causation, as well as 
property causation, can be defined in terms of probabilities. But 
in fact my story is rather more complicated. The difficulty is that 
I don't really have a clear idea of what Sober means by 'token 
causation', and indeed am going to suggest that he is running 
some rather different ideas together. But, still, I want to argue 
that however we read the notion of token causation, there is no 
reason to think of token causes as irreducible to probabilities. 
There is nothing unclear about Sober's notion of property 
causation. Within a given population, one factor S (smoking, 
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say) is a property cause of another factor H (heart attacks, say) if 
and only if S increases the chance of H for every other 
combination of relevant background factors. 
But then, as Sober points out (p. 98), facts about property 
causation leave open the probabilistic structure of the single 
case. Harry's smoking can make Harry's heart attack highly 
probable, even if smoking is not a property cause of heart attacks: 
suppose that smoking increases the probability of heart attacks 
for people like Harry, but decreases it for other kinds of people. 
I agree with Sober that in such a case it is natural to say that 
Harry's smoking caused Harry's heart attack, even though 
smoking is not a property cause of heart attacks. But this doesn't 
seem to me to be any argument at all for a non-probabilistic 
notion of'token' causation. Why not simply insist that when we 
are interested in single-case causation, rather than in property 
causation in the overall population, it is the single-case 
probabilites alone that are relevant? That is, Harry's smoking 
caused Harry's heart attack just in case his smoking increased 
the chance of the heart attack given all the other relevant factors 
then present. Why ever should it matter to the efficacy of Harry's 
smoking that other sets of background conditions, present in 
other cases, but not in Harry's, allow smoking to reduce the 
chance of cancer? From now on I shall say that an instantiation 
of A is a single-case cause of an instantiation of B if the chance of B, 
given A and all the other relevant circumstances then present, 
was greater than the chance B would have had given those other 
circumstances alone. 
Sober seems to feel (p. 103, especially) that even when we know 
all the probabilistic facts about the single case, there can still be 
a question as to whether it was Harry's smoking or, say, his high 
cholesterol level (C) that caused his heart attack. This I find 
puzzling. Suppose for simplicity, as Sober does on p. 103, that S 
and C are the only relevant factors, and that they both increase 
the chance of H in all circumstances. Then surely the situation is 
straightforward. If Harry smokes and has a heart attack, then 
his smoking caused the heart attack, for his smoking increased 
the chance of a heart attack in the circumstances. Similarly, if he 
has high cholesterol and suffers a heart attack, we should say the 
high cholesterol caused his heart attack. And if he both smokes 
and has high cholesterol, then we ought to say that both factors 
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(are part of what) caused H. Both factors were required for H to 
have the chance it did in the circumstances; if either had been 
absent H would have had a lesser chance. 
Of course there may be pragmatic reasons for speaking of 
Harry's smoking, say, rather than his high cholesterol level, as 
'the' cause of his heart attack. Perhaps your audience already 
knows about his high cholesterol level; perhaps you are 
particularly concerned to draw attention to the dangers of 
smoking. But this is a familiar point. There are pragmatic 
reasons for saying it was the short circuit, rather than the 
presence of oxygen, that was 'the' cause of the fire. But since Mill 
it has been clear that such pragmatic differences oughtn't to be 
elevated into a metaphysical distinction. 
Here is a slightly awkward case. Suppose smoking on its own 
increases the chance of heart attack; that cholesterol on its own 
increases it to the same degree; and that smoking and cholesterol 
in combination still give it that same chance. (Prob(H/S & -C) 
= Prob(H/ -S & C) = Prob(H/S & C) > Prob(H/-S & -C).) 
Suppose Harry smokes, and has a high cholesterol level, and 
suffers a heart attack. Given what I've said so far, his smoking 
wouldn't have (been part of what) caused his heart attack, 
because it didn't increase the chance, given the other factors 
then present. But the same goes for the cholesterol level. So we 
seem threatened with the undesirable conclusion that neither 
(was part of what) caused his heart attack. 
But this isn't really a problem about single-case probabilistic 
causation as such. It's simply a particular instance of a more 
general problem: what do we say when something is overdeter-
mined by two prior factors, each of which would have been 
sufficient by itself? The only difference here is that it's the chance 
of H that is overdetermined, not H itself. In general, overdeter-
mination needs somehow to be dealt with as a special case, if we 
are to avoid the unwanted conclusion that nothing causes an 
overdetermined result. I don't see any reason why we shouldn't 
adopt the same strategy when thinking about probabilistic 
causes. 
II 
Mixers and Screeners-Off 
Single-case probabilistic causation seems fairly unproblematic. 
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Yet Sober says that 'token causality is fascinating in its opacity' 
(p. 99); he prefers to avoid any explicit analysis of token 
causality, and restricts himself to suggestions about the epi-
stemological connection between property causation and token 
causation. Why does Sober find token causality so opaque? 
One reason is no doubt that his token causation isn't the same 
as my single-case causation: there are remarks at the end of his 
paper (pp. 110-11) which suggest that he would count my 
'single-case' causation as a version of property causation, with 
'token' causation as something else again. But I shall come back 
to this. For the moment I want to continue focussing on single-
case causation. After all, whatever further rationale lies behind 
Sober's 'token causality', single-case causality seems perfectly 
adequate to answer the question with which Sober himself 
introduces the topic: 'What is it for Harry's smoking to cause 
him to have a heart attack?' (p. 98). 
Moreover, much of what Sober says makes good sense if we 
read 'token causation' as 'single-case causation'. Indeed I would 
like to suggest that much of the plausibility of his 'Connecting 
Principle' derives from this reading of 'token' causation. For 
there is an important, and intuitively familiar, sense in which 
facts about single-case causation are indeed evidenced by, though 
conceptually independent of, facts about property causation 
(or, better, facts about 'population' causation—on which more 
below). This is to do with the familiar situation where we are 
ignorant of some of the background factors which are prob-
abilistically relevant to some result. I want to spend some time 
on this, for it is of some independent interest, quite apart from its 
relevance to Sober's argument. 
Suppose the overall statistics tell us that amongst humans 
heart attacks are more likely if you smoke: Prob(H/S) > 
Prob(H). In such a case Prob(H/S) will almost certainly be a 
'mixed' probability, in the sense that various further factors X 
(metabolic factors, say) will further alter the probability of heart 
attacks: that is, Prob(H/S & X) ^ Prob(H/S & -X) , with 
Prob(H/S) therefore being a weighted average of these further 
two probabilities. No doubt some of these further factors, some 
of these further ways of dividing up our reference class, will be 
known to us. But, still, even after we have divided up the 
reference class in all the ways we know to be relevant, the 
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conditional probabilities we are left with will still usually be 
mixed: even after we have taken into account the known X's, 
there will often be still further wnknown factors that make a 
difference to the difference that S makes to H. This is surely the 
situation with smoking and heart attacks: surely, in addition to 
the factors the medical researchers already know about, there 
are further metabolic, environmental, etc., factors they don't 
yet know about. (I'm not here making the false deterministic 
assumption that the only 'pure', unmixed probabilities are zero 
and one. I'm quite happy to believe that heart attacks are 
undetermined. My point is only that there are surely still some 
factors relevant to their indeterministic chances that we don't 
yet know about.) 
However, even if medical (and agricultural, and sociological, 
and psychological) research generally leaves us with mixed 
probabilities, this doesn't mean that such research is necessarily 
unreliable as a guide to causes. For the inequality Prob(H/S) > 
Prob(H) is a good indication that S sometimes acts as single-case 
cause of H, even if Prob(H/S) is mixed. Think of it this way 
round. If S is ever a single-case cause of H, then there is a set of 
(possibly unknown) background factors in the presence of which 
S increases the chance of H. But Prob(H/S) is a weighted 
average of the difference S makes to H in the presence of all the 
different possible combinations of other relevant factors. So if 
Prob(H/S) > Prob(H), there must be at least one combination of 
other relevant factors where S really increases the chance of H. 
There is of course a well-known flaw in this inference. The 
inequality Prob(H/S) > Prob(H) can be a 'spurious correlation': 
S never really increases the chance of H, but only seems to do so 
because it is itself correlated with the things that do. Smoking 
doesn't really affect your chance of a heart attack, it just seems to 
because anxiety, which really does cause heart attacks, makes 
you more likely to smoke. 
A few sums will help here. Let X stand for some unknown 
further cause of H (like anxiety, for example). Now 
(1) Prob(H/S) = Prob(X/S)Prob(H/S & X) + 
Prob(-X/S)Prob(H/S & -X). 
That's the sense in which Prob(H/S) is a weighted average. And 
similarly, 
 by guest on June 11, 2016
http://aristoteliansupp.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
120 II—DAVID PAPINEAU 
(2) Prob(H/-S) = Prob(X/-S)Prob(H/-S & X) + 
Prob( -X/ -S)Prob(H/ -S & -X) . 
But a comparison between (1) and (2) now makes it clear that 
Prob(H/S) can exceed Prob(H/-S) even though S itself never 
makes a difference to the chance of H: even though, as we say, X 
screens H o/^from S: 
(3) Prob(H/S & X) = Prob(H/-S & X) = Prob(H/X), and 
Prob(H/S & -X) = P r o b ( H / - S & -X) = P r o b ( H / - X ) . 
For even if these last two equalities hold, Prob(H/S) will exceed 
Prob(H/-S) if S is itself positively correlated with X, that is, if 
Prob(X/S) > Prob(X/-S) . 
Some further explanation of these sums might help. It's 
important in this analysis that X is itself positively relevant to H. 
Compare (1) and (2) again. If X and S are positively correlated, 
then - X and S are negatively correlated, and indeed to just the 
same degree: Prob(X/S) - Prob(X/-S) = Prob( -X/ -S) -
Prob(-X/S). But what now guarantees that Prob(H/S) will 
exceed¥roh(Y[/S) when we have the screening-offequalities (3)? 
Why can't the negative difference between the second pair of 
weighting factors, in (1) and (2) respectively, cancel out the 
positive difference between the first pair? But this is where the 
positive relevance of X to H comes in: it means that Prob(H/X) is 
itself bigger than Prob(H/ -X) , and thus (given (3)) that the 
figure which gets weighted by the first pair of weighting factors 
exceeds that weighted by the second pair. 
Conversely, if X is itself negatively relevant to H, then (still 
assuming the screening-off equalities (3)) a positive association 
between S and X will mean that we end up with a 'spurious' 
negative correlation between S and H. 
The point of all this has been to make it clear that not all 
mixed probabilities are spurious. In order for a mixed probability 
to be spurious, the X that does the mixing has to do something 
quite special. Not only must it somehow change the probability 
of H given S, but it has to change it so as to satisfy the equations 
in (3). By no means all 'mixers' do this: presumably it is in fact 
true that anxiety changes the probability of heart attacks given 
smoking, but false that amongst people who are anxious (and 
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amongst those who aren't) smoking makes no further difference 
to the chance of heart attacks. 
Moreover, equations (1) and (2) make it clear that the only 
way a mixed probability can be spurious is for there to be a 
correlation between the putative cause S and some relevant 
mixer X. This point is of fundamental importance for all 
empirical research using statistics. As I suggested above, the 
probabilities uncovered in such research (medical, agricultural, 
etc.) are always likely to be mixed by as yet unknown factors. If 
mixing always carried with it the possibility of screening-off, 
then these research probabilities would be worthless as a basis 
for causal conclusions. But only mixers which are themselves 
associated with S can be screeners-off. So provided we can be 
sure that any unknown mixers aren't themselves associated with 
S, then the mixedness won't matter, for we can still securely infer 
that S does on occasion make a real difference to the chance of 
H. 
This is the point of randomized experiments. If we are in a 
position to ensure that the subjects in some experiment (fields of 
wheat, say) are assigned to the putative cause (a fertilizer) at 
random, then we can be sure that the other factors (amount of 
sunlight, rainfall, and, no doubt, many other unknown causes) 
relevant to the result (crop yield) are themselves probabilistically 
independent of the putative cause: and this then means that any 
probabilistic connection between fertilizer and crop yield must 
be non-spurious, however mixed it might be. (Of course we 
might get a sample association which was misleading about real 
population probabilities. But that's a quite different point. 
Spuriousness, in the sense I have been using it, is nothing to do 
with misleading samples. Spurious probabilities are just as 
much characteristics of the underlying population as pure 
probabilities, or, for that matter, mixed probabilities. All that's 
spurious about them is their causal significance, not their 
probabilistic status.) 
Randomization isn't always possible. We can't always use 
brute experimental force to ensure that any unknown mixers are 
probabilistically independent of the putative cause. In many 
cases it would be morally, or even legally, wrong for experimenters 
to give their 'subjects' the 'relevant treatment' at random. We 
would quite rightly object to a medical experiment which 
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divided a sample of people into two groups at random, and then 
constrained the first group to smoke and the second group not 
to. But even when we can't experiment, we can still survey in a 
way designed to ensure that the resulting statistics aren't 
spurious. What we need to do is consider what unknown mixers 
could possibly be associated with the putative cause, and bring 
them explicitly into the analysis. Thus in conducting a survey 
designed to discover whether smoking is a cause of heart attacks, 
we ought to check which people are anxious and which aren't, 
and see whether smoking still makes a difference within these 
subdivisions; but we needn't worry too much about factors like 
congenital heart abnormalities, say, for, although these are 
certainly relevant to heart attacks, it is difficult to see how they 
could be statistically associated with smoking. Provided we have 
taken explicit account of all the further causes that are 
associated with smoking, it doesn't matter if we ignore the rest, 
for, once more, further causes that are independent of smoking 
can't be responsible for a spurious correlation between smoking 
and heart attacks. 
True, causal conclusions based on surveys will always be 
somewhat less secure than those based on randomized exper-
iments. We might always overlook a possible confounding 
factor: it's just possible, after all, that the some of the causes of 
congenital heart defects are also causes of smoking, and that the 
correlation between smoking and heart attacks is entirely due to 
this. But there is surely room for informed judgement here. It 
would be unduly pessimistic to insist that we can never draw 
causal conclusions from non-experimental statistics unless we 
have taken all relevant factors into account (as opposed to all 
factors themselves associated with the putative cause). If such a 
high degree of security were really required, researchers 
wouldn't have been able to uncover many of the medical and 
social causes that we now know about. 
So both randomized experiments and well-designed surveys 
can give us good grounds forjudging that certain probabilities, 
though mixed, are not spurious; and in such cases we can 
conclude that S is indeed a cause of H. Let us now focus on this 
last notion of causation: in exactly what sense does a mixed 
unscreened-off correlation between S and H show us that S is 'a 
cause' of H? The first point to note is that this causal fact is a fact 
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i 
about the population, rather than about any single case. We can 
I infer that there is some set of background factors in conjunction 
: with which S will increase the chance of H. That is, we can infer 
j that S can cause H, that S sometimes acts so as to cause 
!
 H—namely, when the requisite background factors are present 
I and S is followed by H. I shall call this notion of causation—the 
; kind of causation evidenced by non-spurious mixed probabilities 
—'population' causation. Note that, as I have introduced it, the 
j notion of population causation depends explicitly on the notion 
of single-case causation: S is a population cause of H just in case 
S is capable of being a single-case cause of H (namely, when it is 
conjoined with the requisite background factors and followed by 
H ) -
My 'population' causation has some similarities to Sober's 
'property' causation. Both require a partition of the reference 
class into all the different combinations of presence and absence 
of relevant background factors, and both then depend on what 
further difference S makes to the chance of H within such cells. 
But where Sober's property causation requires S to increase the 
chance of H within all such cells, my population causation only 
demands that S increase the chance of H within at least one such 
cell. (In other cells it can make no difference; it can even 
decrease the chance of H in some cells, provided only that the 
weighted average of the difference it makes over all cells remains 
positive.) Of course, this difference between Sober's 'property' 
and my 'population' causation is in the first instance just a 
matter of definition, not dispute. But note that, whatever the 
virtues of Sober's definition, we are going to need my notion of 
population causation anyway, in order to explain what is 
evidenced by the mixed but non-spurious correlations that 
empirical researchers characteristically go to such pains to 
establish. (Moreover, just this notion of'population' causation is 
crucial to the logic of decision. Newcomb's paradox and related 
cases make it clear that spurious correlations are no good for 
acting on. But if we had to wait for pure probabilities before 
acting, nobody would ever have given up smoking to avoid 
illness. The correct strategy is to act on a probability precisely 
when you have reason to think that, even if mixed, it is not 
spurious. And this is because such probabilities evidence 
population causation: they show that S does sometimes make a 
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difference to the chance of H—and, in particular, they show 
that S makes a positive difference on weighted average over all 
the different types of unknown situation you might be in.) 
The point I have been leading round to in this section is this. 
Suppose there is a mixed but unscreened-off correlation 
between S and H. Then S is a population cause of H. But this 
doesn't mean that a heart attack has to be caused by smoking in 
any particular area. Most obviously, Harry might have a heart 
attack even though he's not a smoker, and then his heart attack 
couldn't be due to his smoking. But even if Harry does smoke, 
and has a heart attack, his smoking needn't be a single-case 
cause of his heart attack. For the population connection 
between smoking and heart attacks only guarantees that S 
sometimes acts so as to cause H—it only guarantees that there is 
some set of background factors in conjunction with which S 
increases the chance of H. There may be other sets of 
background factors together with which S makes no difference 
to the chance of H, or even decreases that chance. So even 
though Harry smokes and has a heart attack, he may be the kind 
of person in whom smoking doesn't increase the chance of a 
heart attack, and then his smoking won't be a single case cause of 
his heart attack. 
Now imagine that we know that both smoking and cholesterol 
are population causes of heart attacks, and that we know 
nothing about other population causes. As above, this can leave 
us in the dark about single cases. Harry can get a heart attack, 
but we mightn't know whether or not he smoked, or whether or 
not he had a high cholesterol level. More interestingly, even if 
we do know that Harry smoked, and that he had a high 
cholesterol level, we mightn't know which, if either, was a 
single-case cause of his heart attack. For Harry might have been 
the kind of person in whom smoking makes no difference to the 
chance of a heart attack; or he might have been the kind of 
person in whom cholesterol makes no difference. 
What about Sober's suggestion that we should appeal to the 
principle of likelihood? Should we prefer that hypothesis about 
the single case that makes the observed result most probable? (I 
know Sober's concepts of causation are different from mine. But 
let me first consider the likelihood suggestion in my own terms. I 
shall return to Sober's concepts shortly.) Let us take the two 
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cases in turn. First, the case where we know nothing about 
Harry, except that he had a heart attack. Second, where we 
know not only that Harry had a heart attack, but also that he was 
a smoker and had a high cholesterol level. In both cases we want 
to know whether Harry's heart attack was caused by his 
smoking or by his high cholesterol. 
In the first case, when we know nothing about Harry except 
that he had a heart attack, the likelihood principle seems clearly 
inadequate. This is not just for the reason that Sober gives: 
namely, that we could know that smoking was positively 
correlated with a negative cause of heart attacks like exercise (p. 
107-8). That's a good enough reason, in its own way, but let's stick 
to the case where the only population causes we know anything 
about are smoking and high cholesterol. Even then the 
likelihood principle doesn't seem to work. Suppose that the 
probability of heart attacks in general is 10%, that the 
probability of heart attacks given high cholesterol is 20%, and 
that the probability of heart attacks given smoking is 90%. This 
might look like good grounds for thinking that somebody who 
gets a heart attack was likely to have been a smoker. But those 
probabilities are consistent with a situation where half the 
population has high cholesterol, but only one in a million is a 
smoker. And, if that were the case, it would clearly be misguided 
to judge that Harry must have been a smoker, just because he 
had a heart attack. The trouble here is that the probability of 
heart attacks given smoking indicates what you ought to believe 
about a heart attack if you know someone is a smoker, but 
abstracts from how likely it is that the person is a smoker in the 
first place. More generally, the trouble is that the likelihood 
principle aims to by-pass decisions about prior probabilities. 
Perhaps there are some inferential contexts where such decisions 
can sensibly be avoided. But the inference from Harry's heart 
attack to his smoking isn't one of them. (From a Bayesian point 
of view, if in addition to knowing that Prob(H/S) = .9, we know 
that Prob(H) = .1 and that Prob(S) = 1/106, then Harry's heart 
attack should make us believe that he smoked to the degree 9/106.) 
What about the second case, where we know that Harry both 
smoked and had high cholesterol, and want to know which of 
these his heart attack was actually due to? Here the likelihood 
principle might seem to make more sense. We don't have to 
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worry about prior probabilities, because we know that the 
causal factors are both present. Surely then the sensible thing is 
to assign the result to the cause that makes the most difference? 
But I don't accept the presupposition that the heart attack must 
be due either to the smoking or to the high cholesterol. As I have 
it, there are actually four possibilities in the single case: the 
background factors then present allow smoking to make a 
difference, but not high cholesterol; the background factors 
allow high cholesterol to make a difference, but not smoking; the 
background factors allow both to make a difference; the 
background factors allow neither to make a difference. All four 
possibilities are left open by the fact that smoking and high 
cholesterol are population causes of heart attacks. And I don't 
see how we can reach any conclusions about the single case 
without some further assumptions about the structure of 
background causes. Thus, for instance, if we believe that heart 
attacks are an indeterministic phenomenon, we will be likely 
to assume (though we won't have to) that both smoking and 
high cholesterol increase the chance of heart attacks for all 
sets of background conditions. And this will incline us to judge 
that Harry's smoking and his high cholesterol are both (part of) 
what caused his heart attack. On the other hand, if we think that 
heart attacks are always determined, then we will think that 
smoking only makes a difference given certain very specific 
background conditions (namely, given conditions together with 
which smoking determined a heart attack); and we will think 
the same about the conditions required for cholesterol to make a 
difference. And so in Harry's case we will probably think that his 
heart attack is due either to his smoking, or to his high 
cholesterol, but not to both. 
My way of reading the question of whether Harry's heart 
attack is due to his smoking or to his high cholesterol is different 
from Sober's. From my point of view, this question only arises 
when we are ignorant of certain facts about the particular case. 
We know that there are certain background factors in 
conjunction with which smoking makes a difference, and we 
know that there are certain background factors in conjunction 
with which high cholesterol makes a difference; but we don't 
know what those background factors are, and so we don't know 
whether Harry has them or not. If we did know what they were, 
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and whether Harry had them, then we would know what 
difference Harry's smoking and his high cholesterol made to the 
chance of his heart attack in the actual circumstances, and then 
we would know whether his smoking, or his high cholesterol, or 
both, were single-case causes of his heart attack. Sober, 
however, thinks that there is a further fact of the matter about 
what 'token caused' Harry's heart attack, even after we know all 
the probabilistically relevant facts about the particular case. 
It seems initially plausible to say that, even if smoking is a 
property cause of heart attacks, there is still a further question as 
to whether Harry's smoking caused Harry's heart attack. But I 
suspect that is because we read this as the question: were Harry's 
actual circumstances such as to allow his smoking to make a 
difference to his chance of a heart attack? This latter question is 
a good question, and one we might still want to ask even after we 
know that smoking is a population cause of heart attacks. But it's 
not Sober's question. For it's fully answered once we know all 
the probabilistic facts about the single case, whereas Sober's 
question is supposed to depend on some yet further fact of the 
matter. 
Ill 
Causal Sequences and Probabilities 
Why might Sober suppose that there is a further fact of the 
matter? Here is one possible line of thought. When smoking does 
cause cancer, presumably it doesn't do so directly. Presumably 
there is some characteristic sequence of intermediate events, 
involving, let us say, nicotine in the bloodstream, spasm of the 
coronary arteries, etc., which occurs when smoking leads to 
heart attacks. And similarly with a high cholesterol level: 
presumably there is a characteristic sequence of, say, blood 
clots, coronary thrombosis, etc., involved when a high cholesterol 
level leads to a heart attack. But surely this now gives a good 
sense in which, even if both S and C increase the chance of H in 
the particular case, it will be either S, or C, but not both, that 
actually 'token causes' H. For presumably we will either have 
the first sequence, involving nicotine, or the second, involving a 
blood clot, but not both, in any particular case. And this will 
then decide whether it was Harry's smoking or his high 
cholesterol which caused his heart attack. 
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But this now changes the rules of the game. So far we have in 
effect been assuming that in each situation only two times 
matter—'earlier' and 'later'—and that the factors present at 
the earlier time (S, C, other relevant background factors) suf-
fice to fix the chances of H at the later time. But this is of 
course a idealization. What happens in between 'earlier' and 
'later' will in general make further difference to the chance of 
H. 
Once we relax the idealization, and recognize that causation 
involves sequences of events, rather than simple earlier-later 
pairs of events, the analysis of probabilistic causation becomes 
much more complicated. But it is still possible. In particular, it is 
still possible to define single-case causation in terms of single-
case probabilities. The trick is to characterize causal sequences 
themselves in terms of single-case probabilities. Once we have 
done this, we shall see that the probabilistic facts are still 
sufficient to determine whether or not Harry's smoking led to his 
heart attack. So bringing in causal sequences still won't give us 
'token' causal facts that transcend the probabilistic facts. 
At first sight it might seem that the existence of intermediate 
causes between S and H, like the nicotine in the bloodstream (N, 
henceforth), undermines the whole analysis of single-case 
causation. (Let's take the 'single-case' as read from now on, 
unless I specify otherwise.) I said originally that an instantiation 
of S is a cause of an instantiation of H if it increases the chance of 
H given all the other circumstances then present. But of course I 
meant 'all other circumstances' present at the 'earlier time'. If 
we include intermediate circumstances that come between S 
and H, like the presence or absence of N, then it's not clear how 
S can ever be a cause of H. In any particular smoker, either there 
will be nicotine in the blood stream or there won't be. If there is, 
then smoking won't make any further difference to the chance of 
a heart attack: the smoking will, so to speak, already have done 
its work. And if there isn't, then the smoking certainly won't 
increase the chance of heart attack. (I'm assuming for simplicity 
that the only route from S to H is through N, so that smokers 
who manage to keep N out of their bloodstream aren't at further 
risk of heart attacks from other effects of smoking.) 
Intermediate causes screen prior causes off from their effects. 
In the presence of N, and in the absence of N, S makes no further 
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difference to the chance of H. So if causes have to make their 
effects more likely, given all the circumstances present in the 
particular case, nobody can ever be caused to have a heart 
attack by smoking. 
What we need here is a distinction between direct and 
indirect causation. Suppose we define direct causes as causes 
that aren't screened off from their effects by anything: an 
instantiation of A is a direct cause of an instantiation of B just in 
case it increases the chance of B given all the factors present on 
that occasion. Then Harry's smoking isn't a direct cause of his 
heart attack, because it is rendered probabilistically irrelevant 
by the presence or absence of nicotine in his blood. But now we 
can define causation in general (direct or indirect) ancestrally: 
as a direct cause, or the direct cause of a cause. Then Harry's 
smoking can still be an (indirect) cause of his heart attack: 
namely, if it directly causes something which. . . which directly 
causes N which directly causes something . . . which directly 
causes H. In effect we have now characterized the notion of a 
causal sequence: a succession of events in which each one is a direct 
cause of the next. And so we can simply say that one event is a 
cause of another (direct or indirect) if there is a causal sequence 
leading from the first to the second. 
What about the obvious objection—what if, as seems likely, 
all sequences of events are causally dense, in the sense that 
between any two events we can always find an intervening third 
which screens the first off from the second? Then there won't be 
any direct causes, and so, given the above definitions, no causes 
of any kind. Here we need to appeal to some kind of limiting 
process. Suppose, given some actual sequence of events, we start 
with a coarse approximation, which pictures it as a series of 
discrete events, separated by finite time intervals. Then relative 
to this approximation we can pick out (apparent) direct causes, 
and hence (apparent) causal sequences. Then we can take series 
of finer and finer approximations, and specify that X is a 
genuine causal sequence if and only if for every such series there 
is some approximation beyond which all further approximations, 
however fine, present X as an (apparent) causal sequence. If 
causal sequences are really dense, then at bottom there won't be 
any direct causes. But apparent direct causation in discrete 
approximations will do the necessary work. (In what follows I 
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shall revert to the convenient fiction that causal sequences are 
discrete.) 
Here is a further difficulty. So far I have been assuming that, 
if two events are causally connected, the first is the cause and 
the second the effect. But it's not clear that the probabilities 
justify this. Probabilistic dependence is a symmetrical re-
lation: if Prob(H/S) > Prob(H/-S) , then so also is Prob(S/H) > 
Prob(S/-H), for, after all, both are equivalent to the manifestly 
symmetrical Prob(H & S) > Prob(H).Prob(S). Nor is the 
analysis of direct causation and causal sequences of much help 
here. I have been assuming that if A has a direct causal 
connection with some succeeding B, and B has a direct causal 
connection with a succeeding C, then A must cause B which 
causes C. But again it's not clear why the probabilities should 
justify this. The probabilities themselves (A screened off from C 
by B; nothing screening off A from B, or B from C) are just as 
consistent with B being the common cause of A and C 
(A—B—-C), or indeed with C causing B which causes A 
(A*-B—C), as with A causing B causing C (A—B—C). 
Of course, if we build the direction of time into the direction of 
causation, then there is no problem: we can simply continue to 
assume, as I have been doing throughout, that, given two 
causally connected events, the earlier is the cause and the later 
the effect. But there are good reasons for not reducing the 
direction of causation to the direction of time (not least being the 
attractions of the converse reduction). It's relatively straight-
forward to explain directional causation in terms of probability 
and time; it would be nice to explain it without time, in terms of 
probabilities alone. But this is not the place to pursue this issue. 
(I think that the way forward lies in the fact that, while B's 
screening off A from C is consistent with B's being causally 
between A and C, and with B's being a common cause of A and 
C, it's not consistent with B's being a common effect of A and C. 
For more on this see Hausman (1984) and Papineau (1985).) 
IV 
Negative Causes 
As I had it in the last section, each stage in a causal sequence 
needs to be positively relevant to the next. Sober disagrees. 'A 
gold ball rolling towards the cup is kicked by a squirrel, which 
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thereby lowers the ball's probability of going into the cup. 
Improbably enough, though, the ball ricochets here and there 
and then drops in. Here is a case in which the kick token-caused 
the ball to drop in, even though a kick of just that kind is not a 
positive causal factor for producing balls in cups' (p. 99). 
If Sober is right here, then we have a strong argument for 
doubting that causal notions can always be defined in terms of 
probabilities. Whatever one thinks of the details, it at least 
makes initial sense to characterize causes as things that increase 
the chances of their effects. But if we have to allow that causes 
can sometimes decrease the chances of their effects too, then we 
will need some extra hold on cause-effect relationships: the idea 
of one thing either increasing or decreasing the chance of another 
is surely far too general to pick out causes. 
Sober reinforces the point by observing (also p. 99) that in 
Cartwright's lucky plant example, by contrast with the squirrel 
example, we don't say that the spraying by a defoliant caused 
the plant to survive. But the lucky plant and the squirrel case 
have just the same probabilistic structure. So, if we agree with 
Sober's intuitions that their causal structure is different, the 
difference must lie in something other than the probabilities. 
I agree that the defoliant didn't cause the plant to survive. 
But, according to my intuitions, the kick didn't cause the ball to 
drop in the hole either. After all, the incident with the squirrel 
scarcely helped the ball get into the cup. Sure, the ball ended up 
in the cup. But that was just a matter of luck, given the kick. It 
wasn't because of the kick. 
More generally, my intuitions are against causes that reduce 
the chances of their effects. I don't think we ought to allow 
negative causes. On the other hand, as I shall explain in a 
moment, there are strong internal reasons within the theory of 
probabilistic causation for admitting negative causes. I think 
that this casts doubt on the theory of probabilistic causation. But 
first it will be helpful to get something else out of the way. 
Wesley Salmon (1984) distinguishes between causal processes 
and pseudo-processes. Where causal processes can transmit 
marks, pseudo-processes cannot. Thus a moving shadow is a 
pseudo-process: you can't affect the later stages of a shadow by 
acting on its earlier stages. (Which is just as well, since moving 
shadows can travel faster than the speed of light.) 
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This is a useful and important distinction. The idea of 
transmitting marks might seem suspiciously anthropocentric. 
But this is not essential to the distinction. We can say that causal 
processes are those processes that characteristically carry causal 
sequences: the later features of a causal process are made more 
probable by earlier features. In pseudo-processes too there are 
correlations between earlier and later stages: but these correlations 
will be screened off by events not themselves part of those 
pseudo-processes. Paradigm cases of causal processes are the 
continued existence of a physical object, or the transmission of 
radiation; other examples would be one species giving rise to 
another, or the spread of germs through a population. 
However, one can accept the idea of causal processes without 
concluding, as both Salmon and Sober seem to, that the later 
stages of such a process are always caused by the earlier ones. In 
particular, there is no need to accept this when a later stage of a 
causal process is made less probable by an earlier stage. Consider 
this case. People are causal processes. They characteristically 
carry many different causal sequences. Thus, for instance, 
whether you are a fat or a thin adult is largely dependent on 
whether you were a fat or a thin child. Suppose I was a fat child 
but am now a thin man. Should we say, just because I am a 
person, and people are causal processes, that my present 
thinness is the result of my childhood fatness? This seems silly. 
Childhood fatness increases the chance of adult fatness. If I am 
lucky enough to be thin, even though starting off fat, this is 
surely despite my initial fatness, not because of it. 
Causal processes are certain kinds of space-time lines, certain 
kinds of sequences of space-time points. We pick them out 
because lines of those kinds tend to carry causal sequences, 
sequences of instantiations of properties such that the earlier 
instantiations make the later instantiations more probable. But 
when we actually get an improbable later won-instantiation, 
there is surely no need to say that it was caused by the earlier 
features which made it improbable. 
My argument here presupposes that causation is a relationship 
between instantiations of properties, not between bare particulars. 
Causal processes are processes whose earlier properties charac-
teristically cause their later properties. I don't see any point in 
saying that the earlier points in such a process cause the later 
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points, independently of whether the properties instantiated at 
those points cause each other. 
Sober argues that token causation is independent of property 
instantiations: token-causal connections are 'like channels in 
which information flows; the existence of the channel does not 
imply what information (if any) actually flows over it' (p. 110). 
His argument here hinges on his appeal to the likelihood 
principle: we can't measure the support of the hypothesis that Fa 
token-caused Gb by the likelihood ¥rob(Gb/Fa, & Fa token-
caused Gb), because 'Fa token-caused Gb' implies that Gb 
actually occurred, so this probability will always be one; 
instead we have to use Prob(Gb/Fa, & a token-caused b). I don't 
really know what to make of this argument. When Sober first 
introduces his Connecting Principle, in section II, there is no 
mention of probabilities conditional on hypotheses about token 
causation. His suggestion is merely that we can measure the 
support of such token-causal hypotheses by (weighted averages 
of differences between) probabilities of the form Prob(E/C). 
There is no reference to token causes inside the probability 
functions. It is rather puzzling that they start appearing there in 
section IV. Token causality is supposed to be an opaque notion, 
and the point of the Connecting Principle is to give us some 
evidential hold on it. So the Connecting Principle ought to 
specify degrees of support for token-causal hypotheses in terms 
that do not themselves involve the notion of token causation. 
Which is what happens in section II: the degrees of support for 
token-causal hypotheses are to vary with the independently 
understood Prob(E/C)'s. But how are we supposed to understand 
the Prob(Gb1 Fa, & a token caused b)'s of section IV? What values 
do these probabilities have? Are they just equal to Prob(GbfFa)? 
But then why not leave them as such? There seems no good 
reason to complicate the story, and therefore no good reason 
why we should think of token causation as a relationship 
between bare particulars. 
I want to conclude by casting some doubt on the whole idea of 
probabilistic causation. Now we have separated out Salmon's 
notion of a causal process, there is surely nothing intuitively 
attractive about negative causes. Yet it is difficult for advocates 
of probabilistic causation to avoid them. Perhaps we would do 
better to avoid probabilistic causation instead. 
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Let me explain. Probabilistic causation is a response to 
indeterminism. Before twentieth-century physics overthrew 
determinism, modern philosophy took it for granted that causes 
had to determine their effects. If Harry's heart attack was caused 
by his smoking, then the latter determined the former. But 
quantum mechanics has made us accept that Harry can have a 
heart attack even though the prior circumstances didn't make 
this inevitable. So philosophers have responded by arguing that 
as long as Harry's smoking makes his heart attack more likely, 
then that's enough for the former to cause the latter. 
But probabilistic causation isn't the only possible response to 
indeterminism. We could instead maintain the old view that 
causation is per se deterministic, and simply say that in so far as 
Harry's heart attack wasn't determined, it wasn't caused either. 
There would still be some causation in Harry's case. Harry's 
smoking would still cause the increased chance of a heart attack. 
Even if the heart attack isn't determined, we can think of this 
increased chance as itself an objective feature of the situation, 
and indeed as something determined by Harry's smoking. 
Perhaps this seems unnatural. After all, we're much more 
interested in actual results, like Harry's heart attack, than in 
their chances of occurring. So, apart from simple conservatism, 
what's the point of sticking to the old view that causation is 
deterministic? The only result seems to be that we are forced to 
stop talking about the causes of the things we are really 
interested in. 
But it's not all plain sailing for probabilistic causation either. 
Recall the notion of a causal sequence discussed in the last 
section. If one thing causes another at a temporal distance, it will 
be via a sequence of linking events each of which directly causes 
the next. But if direct causes have to increase the probability of 
their effects, this is a very strong requirement. When one thing 
leads to another, there will often be some stage in the sequence 
which in the circumstances reduces the chance of the eventual 
result. 
This difficulty has always been apparent to theorists of 
probabilistic causation. Suppes (1970) discusses a version of the 
squirrel case. But I would prefer to avoid the usual examples and 
instead construct an idealized situation whose probabilistic 
structure is quite unambiguous. (There is always a danger of 
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reading more into the squirrel case than you are supposed to, 
and assuming that given a fuller description of the circumstances 
the kick would make the sinking highly probable, or even 
inevitable. I suspect that this is why some people's intuitions are 
that the squirrel's kick does cause the ball to go into the hole.) 
Imagine the following simple maze. You choose whether to go 
left or right three times in succession, the choice depending on 
the toss of an indeterministic coin. Success consists in ending at 
one of the two right termini, failure in ending at one of the two 
left termini. Suppose your actual path through the maze is as 
follows. First you go right (A); then you take a left turn (B); but 
then you take a right turn, and so succeed (S). 
Failure : Success 
Presumably, on the probabilistic theory of causation, A 
caused the eventual success. After all, the chance of success was 
greatly increased by A: Prob(S/A) = 75%, Prob(S/-A) =25%. 
But if A caused S, then presumably it did so via causing B, which 
then causes S. Now, there's no problem about A causing B: the 
chance of B given not-A is zero. But what about B causing S? B 
made S less likely. In the circumstances Prob(S/B) = 50%, yet 
Prob(S/-B) = 100%. 
There are a number of ways to go here. One possible solution 
would be to accept that B doesn't cause S, but still insist that A 
does. But this would be a kind of action at a temporal distance. I 
take it that this is unacceptable. Another solution would be to 
accept that A doesn't cause S after all. But the initial attraction 
of the probabilistic theory was that it allowed us to talk about 
actual results, like the eventual success, as being caused even 
when they aren't determined. If we impose the strong requirement 
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that all intermediate causes have to make their successors more 
likely, its not clear that we will be left with very many 
temporally separated cause-effect pairs in a indeterministic 
world. 
So the preferred solution for many advocates of probabilistic 
causality is to maintain that one thing (B) can cause another (S) 
even though it makes it less likely. This then allows them to have 
A causing S via a continuous sequence of intermediate causes. 
(This rationale for negative causes is particularly clear in 
Salmon, op. cit., Ch. 7.) 
But I still don't like negative causes. S doesn't happen because 
of B, any more than I 'm now thin because I was once fat. S 
happens despite B. If the cost of the probabilistic theory is 
negative causes, surely we would do better to abandon 
probabilistic causation altogether. 
If we stick to the old-fashioned deterministic view of causation 
we can describe the goings-on in the maze without getting into 
tangles. A causes S to have a 75% chance, and B to have a 50% 
chance. When B happens, S's chance is caused to go down to 
50%. That 's all the causing there is in the maze. Some other 
things happen. B happens. But B itself (as opposed to B's having 
a 50% chance) isn't caused by A. And S happens. But S itself (as 
opposed to S having a 75% chance, and then, later, a 50% 
chance) isn't caused either. 
More generally, I would suggest that deterministic causation 
gives us a far simpler way of saying everything we need to say 
than probabilistic causation. But a full defence of this suggestion 
will have to wait for another time. 
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